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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Retirement plans can be complex documents that span 
hundreds of pages with numerous peculiarities.  But when do 
a plan’s terms move from merely complex to ambiguous?  That 
is the question in this pension plan dispute.  Former Union 
Pacific employee John Dowling is covered by a 277-page 
retirement plan composed of introductory material, 19 articles 
of content, and various appendices—none of which explicitly 
address Dowling’s precise situation.  When Dowling retired, 
the plan administrator interpreted the plan to provide Dowling 
with a lower monthly payment than he expected.  Dowling 
challenged the administrator’s decision as contradicting the 
plan’s plain language, but the District Court found the plan 
ambiguous and the administrator’s interpretation reasonable.  
Dowling appealed, and the dispute now centers on three issues:  
the text of the plan, our standard of review, and whether a 
conflict of interest alters the outcome.  Because the plan’s 
terminology, silence, and structure render it ambiguous, the 
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plan accords the plan administrator discretion to interpret 
ambiguous plan terms, and the mere existence of a conflict of 
interest is alone insufficient to raise skepticism of the plan 
administrator’s decision, we will grant deference to the plan 
administrator and affirm. 
I.  
 Dowling was hired at age 41 by Appellee Union Pacific 
Corporation in 1988, where he served in the high-ranking 
position of Vice President for Corporate Development.  Just 
seven years later, Dowling’s life was dealt a severe blow when 
he was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. 
 By 1997, Union Pacific had determined that Dowling 
possessed a “Total Disability,” because he was “unable to work 
at any job.”  (App. 153, 520.)  That decision made Dowling 
eligible for long-term disability benefits that he could receive 
for the duration of his disability or until he reached age 65 in 
2012, whichever came first.   
 When Dowling turned 65 in 2012, the long-term 
disability benefits stopped, and he began to draw on his Union 
Pacific retirement.  His credited years of service for purposes 
of calculating his pension benefit included the 15 years he 
received disability benefits.  Union Pacific’s plan administrator 
interpreted the plan to require that Dowling’s pension be 
calculated in accordance with what the administrator saw as 
applicable to disabled plan participants:  Instead of calculating 
Dowling’s pension based on Dowling’s last ten years of actual 
work—ending in 1997—the administrator operated as if 
Dowling had worked and been paid his final base salary—
$208,000 per year— for his credited years of service, up until 
his retirement in 2012, even though Dowling had not in reality 
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worked during that period.  Under the administrator’s 
interpretation, Dowling was entitled to a monthly pension 
payment of $7,006.96. 
 Dowling objected to the calculation and filed a claim 
via the plan’s administrative procedures, asking for a benefit 
increase.  He argued the plan required his pension payment to 
be based on his ten years of income prior to 1997, when he 
became disabled and stopped working, and not a hypothetical 
income stream for the ten years prior to his 2012 formal 
retirement date.  If Dowling’s theory about the 1987 to 1997 
window were correct, then Union Pacific would owe Dowling 
a much higher monthly payment because during that earlier 
period Dowling received significant performance bonuses on 
top of his base salary. 
 Dowling lost his administrative claim, exhausted his 
administrative remedies, and filed this action against Union 
Pacific and the other Appellees in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Dowling sought a declaratory judgment stating 
his rights and liabilities, pursuant to ERISA.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(1)(B).  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Union Pacific, holding that the plan 
administrator’s interpretation of the plan was not unreasonable, 
and Dowling appealed. 
II.  
 Dowling’s retirement is governed by Union Pacific’s 
“Pension Plan for Salaried Employees.”  The plan is a 
substantial legal document:  it opens with seven pages of 
preliminary information, then continues across 133 pages of 
content divided into 19 articles.  At the back are 137 pages of 
appendices, schedules, exhibits, and tables.   
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 Out of all this material, two key factors largely 
determine the amount of a plan participant’s pension payment:  
compensation and service.  The compensation factor is called 
“Final Average Compensation” and is defined as a plan 
participant’s average monthly salary during his or her three 
highest-earning years—the “high-three”—during the ten years 
“immediately preceding . . . the last date on which [the plan 
participant] is a Covered Employee.”  (Plan § 2.35, App. 144.1)  
The service factor is the participant’s “Credited Service,” 
which refers to the amount of time a plan participant spent as a 
“Covered Employee.”  Thus, for the run-of-the-mill plan 
participant, pension calculation is easy:  it is based on the years 
the individual spent at work, and his average paycheck during 
his three highest-earning years of his final ten years of 
employment. 
 But the plan treats a disabled participant differently.  For 
Credited Service, instead of stopping the accumulation of 
service when the disabled participant stops work, as is the case 
with the typical participant, the plan permits disabled 
participants to accumulate service during their pre-retirement, 
post-disability years, “as if” they remained Covered 
Employees until their date of retirement—even though they 
may have stopped working years earlier.  (Plan §§ 4.02(c)(2), 
6.05, App. 157, 178; see also Plan § 2.40(a)(5), App. 148 
                                              
 1 Plan § 2.35 states in pertinent part, “‘Final Average 
Compensation’ shall mean the average of the Participant’s 
monthly Compensation for the 36 consecutive calendar months 
of highest Compensation within the 120-calendar month period 
immediately preceding . . . the last date on which he is a 
Covered Employee.”  (Plan § 2.35, App. 144.) 
7 
 
(noting the “Hours of Service” credited to not-working 
disabled participants).2) 
                                              
 2 Plan § 4.02(c)(2) states, “A Disabled Participant who 
is a Covered Employee on his Disability Date shall be credited 
with years of Credited Service as if he were a Covered 
Employee from his Disability Date to the date on which he 
ceases to be a Disabled Participant as set forth in Section 6.05.”  
(Plan § 4.02(c)(2), App. 157.) 
 
 Plan § 6.05 states in pertinent part,  
 
[A] Participant who has a Disability Date shall 
continue to be credited with years of Vesting 
Service and Credited Service (to the extent 
provided in Section 4.02(c)(2)) while he remains 
a Disabled Participant.  A Disabled Participant 
shall cease to be such if and when: 
 
 (a)  he ceases to suffer from a Total 
Disability; 
 
 (b)  he ceases to receive benefits under 
the Long Term Disability Plan of Union Pacific 
Corporation; 
 
 (c)  he dies; or 
 
 (d) he elects a Benefit Payment 
Date. . . . 
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 For Final Average Compensation, the plan’s application 
to disabled participants is less clear, with the confusion largely 
centering on the plan’s use of the term “absence.”  During an 
“absence” from work, a plan participant is “deemed to have 
received” for the duration of their absence “Compensation at 
the base pay rate in effect” prior to the absence.  (Plan 
§ 2.18(a)(3)(C), App. 139.3)  Thus, for purposes of pension 
                                              
When a Disabled Participant ceases to be such, 
he shall cease to be credited with years of 
Vesting Service and Credited Service, and he 
shall be entitled to a pension under the other 
provisions of this Article (or Article VII), 
applied as if his Separation from Service 
occurred on the date he ceased to be a Disabled 
Participant . . . . 
 
(Plan § 6.05, App. 178.) 
  
3 Plan § 2.18(a)(3)(C) states in pertinent part, 
 
(C)  During a period when an Employee 
receives credit for Hours of Service under 
Section 2.40 for a period of absence immediately 
prior to which he is a Covered Employee and 
which Hours of Service are counted in 
determining his Credited Service under Section 
4.02: 
 
 (i)  the Employee, if employed on a 
full-time basis at the start of the absence, shall be 
deemed to have received Compensation at the 
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calculation, the rate of pay during an employee’s unpaid 
absence is deemed to be their pay prior to the absence.  But 
does the definition of “absence” extend to time away from 
work due to disability?  The plan is not clear.  The lengthy 
definitions section does not define “absence.”  (See Plan 
§ 2.01-2.76, App. 131-54 (defining 76 terms, over 23 pages, 
but providing no definition for “absence”).)  The plan does 
define two particular types of absences—absences for 
temporary family medical leave, and temporary approved 
absences, (Plan § 2.10, App. 134-35 (defining “Approved 
Absence”); Plan § 2.10B, App. 135 (defining “Approved Non-
HCE Absence”)4)—and it references two more types of 
                                              
base pay rate in effect for him as of the first day 
of the month in which such period begins and 
shall also be credited with any Compensation 
described in (3)(A)(ii) through (iv), above, that 
is actually paid to him during that period; . . . . 
 
(Plan § 2.18(a)(3)(C), App. 139.) 
 
 4 Plan § 2.10 states, 
 
“Approved Absence” shall mean the period 
during which an Employee absents himself from 
work without compensation (to the extent 
evident in personnel records of the Employer or 
the Affiliated Company), by reason of: 
 
 (a)  a period of absence for personal or 
other reasons, provided that such person returns 
to work for the Employer or such Affiliated 
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Company at such time as the Employer or such 
Affiliated Company may reasonably require, or 
 
 (b)  a family or medical leave within 
the meaning of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993, provided, however, that effective 
for leaves of absence beginning on or after 
January l, 1999, such person returns to work after 
the family and medical leave at such time as the 
Employer or Affiliated Company may 
reasonably require. 
 
In the authorization of an Approved Absence 
under subsection (a) and in the requirements set 
forth with respect to assuring the return of the 
Employee to work within a reasonable time, the 
Employer or an Affiliated Company shall treat 
all Employees under similar circumstances in a 
like manner. 
 
(Plan § 2.10, App. 134-35.) 
 
 Plan § 2.10B states, 
 
“Approved Non-HCE Absence” shall mean, 
effective January 1, 2008, the period during 
which an Employee who is not a Highly 
Compensated Employee absents himself from 
work without compensation (to the extent 
evident in personnel records of the Employer or 
Affiliated Company), by reason of a period of 
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“absences” in the “Hours of Service” section, which details 
how much time should be credited in various scenarios. (Plan 
§ 2.40(a)(4), App. 147-48 (listing as examples Approved 
Absences, temporary lay-offs, military leave, and Approved 
Non-HCE Absences) 5).  A departure from work due to 
                                              
absence for a purpose described in a leave of 
absence policy of the Employer or an Affiliated 
Company, but the duration of which is longer 
than otherwise permitted under such policy, and 
with the approval or at the requirement of the 
Employer or such Affiliated Company, provided 
that such person returns to work for the 
Employer or such Affiliated Company at such 
time as the Employer or such Affiliated 
Company may reasonably require. 
 
(Plan § 2.10B, App. 135.) 
 
 5 Plan § 2.40 states in pertinent part, 
 
“Hour of Service” shall mean, . . . 
 
 (a) With respect to a Participant (other 
than a Disabled Participant) whose Separation 
from Service occurs prior to January 1, 1999 and 
with respect to a Disabled Participant who ceases 
to be such prior to January 1, 1999:  
 
. . . . 
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disability is not one of the four examples of “absence” listed.  
Additionally, a different subsection in the “Hours of Service” 
section addresses the hours credited during “Total Disability”; 
that subsection is directly below the “absences” subsection, 
and does not mention “absences.”  (Plan § 2.40(a)(5), App. 
148.) 
 More generally, the plan grants the plan administrator 
the authority “to determine all questions of . . . eligibility, . . . 
to make factual determinations, . . . to construe and interpret 
the provisions of the Plan, to correct defects and resolve 
ambiguities therein, and to supply omissions thereto.”  (Plan 
                                              
  (4) 10 Hours of Service for 
each day on which the Employee is absent (A) 
on an Approved Absence, (B) for temporary lay-
off on account of reduction in force provided 
there is a return to work at the first available 
opportunity, (C) for military service under leave 
granted by the Employer or Affiliated Company 
or required by law provided the Employee 
returns to service with the Employer or Affiliated 
Company within such period as his right to 
reemployment is protected by law, or (D) 
effective January 1, 2008, on an Approved Non-
HCE Absence. 
 
  (5) 10 Hours of Service for 
each day of an Employee’s Total Disability. 
 
(Plan § 2.40(a)(4)-(5), App. 147-48.) 
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§ 13.02(f), App. 242.6)  The plan is funded entirely by Union 
Pacific; contributions are neither required nor accepted from 
plan participants.  (Plan § 12.01-03, App. 232.7) 
                                              
 6 Plan § 13.02 states in pertinent part, 
 
Authority and Responsibility of the Named 
Fiduciary-Plan Administration.  The Named 
Fiduciary-Plan Administration shall be the Plan 
“administrator” as such term is defined in section 
3(16) of ERISA, and as such shall have the 
following duties and responsibilities: 
 
. . . . 
 
 (f) to determine all questions of the 
eligibility of Employees and of the status of 
rights of Participants, Surviving Spouses, 
Beneficiaries and Alternate Payees, to make 
factual determinations, to construe and interpret 
the provisions of the Plan, to correct defects and 
resolve ambiguities therein, and to supply 
omissions thereto; . . . . 
 
(Plan § 13.02, App. 242.) 
 
 7 Plan §§ 12.01-03 states in pertinent part,  
 
Sec. 12.01 Employer Contributions.  Subject to 
Section 12.06, the Employer shall contribute 
such amounts as are necessary to satisfy the 
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 During the times relevant here, the plan’s designated 
administrators, including Barbara Schaefer [Schaefer isn’t 
listed as an Appellee], Roy Schroer, and Edwin A. Willis, were 
also Union Pacific employees or officers.  Schaefer and 
Schroer each held the title of Vice President for Human 
Resources, and Willis was Assistant Vice President for 
Compensation and Benefits. 
III.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
                                              
minimum funding standards required pursuant to 
ERISA and section 412 of the Code, as from time 
to time amended.  . . . The Employer shall have 
the right, but not the obligation, to contribute 
such additional amounts as it, in its sole 
discretion, deems desirable in any year.  All 
Employer contributions shall be paid to the 
Trustee.  . . . .  
 
Sec. 12.02 Mandatory Participant Contributions.  
No contributions shall be required of Participants 
under the Plan. 
 
Sec. 12.03 Voluntary Participant Contributions.  
No contributions shall be accepted from any 
Participant under the Plan. 
 
(Plan §§ 12.01-03, App. 232.) 
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IV.  
 Federal courts review the decisions of ERISA plan 
administrators under standards derived from “principles of 
trust law,” in that the plan document itself determines the 
appropriate level of review.  Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 
506, 512 (2010) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989)).  In the default scenario, a 
plan administrator’s “denial of benefits . . . is to be reviewed 
under a de novo standard.”  Id. (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
115).  But if the plan document “gives the administrator or 
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for 
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” then the Court 
reviews the administrator’s decision on a more deferential 
basis.  Id. (quoting Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115).   
 This case falls in the latter scenario, because the Union 
Pacific plan explicitly grants the administrator the ability to 
determine benefit eligibility and to “construe and interpret” the 
plan’s provisions.  (Plan § 13.02(f), App. 242.)  In such 
circumstances, we will not set aside the administrator’s 
interpretations of “unambiguous plan language” as long as 
those interpretations are “reasonably consistent” with the 
plan’s text, Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bill Gray Enters. v. Gourley, 248 F.3d 
206, 218 (3d Cir. 2001)), and we will only disturb the 
administrator’s interpretations of ambiguous plan language 
when those interpretations are “arbitrary and capricious,” id. 
(quoting McElroy v. SmithKline Beecham Health & Welfare 
Benefits Tr. Plan, 340 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Whether 
plan language is ambiguous or unambiguous is itself a question 
of law subject to our de novo review, with the definition of 
ambiguity being language that is “subject to reasonable 
alternative interpretations.”  Id. (quoting Taylor v. Cont’l Grp. 
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Change in Control Severance Pay Plan, 933 F.2d 1227, 1233 
(3d Cir. 1991)).  Many cases will therefore turn, as this one 
does, on whether a proffered interpretation of plan language is 
“reasonable.” 
 Courts apply this deferential standard for at least two 
good reasons.  First, courts have an obligation to give effect to 
the plan-drafter’s intentions, because “ERISA abounds with 
the language and terminology of trust law,” Firestone, 489 
U.S. at 110, and the hallmark purpose of trust law is “to 
accomplish the settlor’s intentions,” Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts, Foreword (Am. Law Inst. 2003).  Here, since the plan-
drafter explicitly specified that the plan administrator should 
possess the ability to interpret terms, we must be deferential 
because the de novo alternative—examining each of the plan 
administrator’s legal decisions anew—would undermine rather 
than give effect to the drafter’s wishes.  
 Second, giving deference pays heed to Congress’s 
concern for not discouraging employers in their adoption of 
ERISA plans.  Existing federal statutes do not require 
employers to offer employee-retirement plans, and when 
Congress passed ERISA to make retirement programs fairer, it 
also worked to reduce the burdens of its new regulations and 
to keep in check disincentives that might discourage an 
employer from offering a retirement plan at all—disincentives 
such as high “administrative costs” and “litigation expenses.”  
Conkright, 559 U.S. at 517 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 
U.S. 489, 497 (1996)).  To that end, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that employers often commit the power of 
interpretation to a plan administrator because doing so serves 
the employer’s interests of efficiency, predictability, and 
uniformity—interests ERISA seeks to protect.  Id.  Thus, when 
a court pays deference to the administrator at the request of the 
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plan-drafter, the court acts in congruence with Congress’s 
wishes. 
V.  
 We now turn to the debate over the meaning of the 
plan’s terms.  Union Pacific argues the plan requires the 
administrator, in light of Dowling’s status as a disabled 
participant, to “deem” Dowling to have been paid his final base 
salary from the moment he became totally disabled in 1997 
until he retired in 2012, and then calculate his Final Average 
Compensation from those deemed earnings based on the ten-
year window from 2002 to 2012.  That is the approach the plan 
administrator took and the District Court found reasonable.  
Dowling, on the other hand, argues Union Pacific’s 
interpretation involves too many interpretive gymnastics:  
Dowling stopped working and earning a salary in 1997 and his 
ten-year window must accordingly look backward from 1997, 
even though he continued to accrue credited service until 2012.  
 We pass no judgment as to which proffered 
interpretation is best, because at least three aspects of the plan 
combine to make it ambiguous and each party’s interpretation 
reasonable.  The first aspect is the plan’s use of the word 
“absence.”  Is a person who is not at work due to a disability 
“absent”?  Union Pacific says yes; Dowling says no.  If yes, 
then Plan § 2.18(a)(3)(C)—which “deems” a participant to 
have been paid during an “absence”—can reasonably be read 
as requiring the administrator to deem disabled persons to be 
paid their base salaries for the duration of their disability, up 
until their retirement date, for purposes of calculating Final 
Average Compensation.  That would mean that Dowling 
should be counted as earning his base salary up until 2012, as 
the administrator found.  But on the other hand, if time spent 
18 
 
not working due to disability is not an “absence,” then the 
plan’s language favors Dowling and disabled participants are 
not “deemed” to receive any pay at all after they leave work, 
and the only reasonable approach would be to calculate Final 
Average Compensation by looking backward from the date the 
person became totally disabled and stopped working—1997 in 
Dowling’s case. 
 The plan administrator adopted the former approach, 
that missing work due to disability does in fact constitute an 
“absence.”  Dowling argues that the administrator went too far 
in extending the definition of “absence” to cover indefinite 
departures from work, and that only more limited short-term 
departures should count.   
Because “absence” is given no specialized meaning in 
the plan’s definitions section, the word must be interpreted in 
accordance with its generally prevailing meaning, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 202(3)(a) (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
(“Rules in Aid of Interpretation”),8 and its generally prevailing 
                                              
 8 A similar rule of construction is advisable under the 
Restatement (Third) of Property, the recommended 
restatement for trust-document interpretation.  It recommends 
that for courts seeking the drafter’s meaning of text in a trust 
document, “words and phrases” should be “presumed to bear 
their customary legal terminology” if the “drafter is a legal 
professional or other person experienced in the use of legal 
terminology” and there is no “[e]xtrinsic evidence” going to 
the drafter’s subjective intention.  Restatement (Third) of 
Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 10.2 cmt. e 
(2003); see also Restatement (Third) of Trusts, Ch. 1 intro. 
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meaning is broad—it means nothing more specific than the 
state of being “[n]ot present,” Absent, Oxford English 
Dictionary (3d ed. 2009).  While a person who misses one day 
of work can surely be said to be “not present,” and thereby 
“absent,” so can a person who endures an indefinite departure 
from work, whether due to disability or some other reason.  
Michael Jordan’s three-year hiatus from basketball was an 
“absence,” according to the New York Times.9  Rick Moranis’s 
18-year disappearance from film was an “absence” in the eyes 
of the Hollywood Reporter.10  And Miles Davis’s five-year 
departure from music in the 1970’s was an “absence” as well, 
as told by National Public Radio.11  Thus, given that the 
generally prevailing meaning of “absence” permits the word to 
be used to refer to indefinite departures from the workplace, 
                                              
note (referring readers to the Restatement (Third) of Property 
for “general rules of interpretation and construction”). 
  
9 Harvey Araton, Sports of the Times; Jordan, a Bit 
Older, Comes Up Short, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/sports/sports-of-the-
times-jordan-a-bit-older-comes-up-short.html.   
 
 10  Ryan Parker, Rick Moranis Reveals Why He Turned 
Down “Ghostbusters” Reboot:  “It Makes No Sense to Me,” 
Hollywood Reporter (Oct. 7, 2015),  
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/features/rick-moranis-
reveals-why-he-829779.   
 
 11 Fresh Air (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 1, 2016), 
transcript excerpt available at 
 http://www.npr.org/2016/04/01/472580940/-miles-ahead-
shows-a-dissipated-davis-who-s-still-burning-hot. 
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we find the administrator’s use of the same word in the same 
manner to be reasonable. 
 Dowling argues we must reject the administrator’s 
interpretation of the word “absence,” because the plan requires 
a specialized, narrower interpretation that applies only to 
shorter departures from work.  For authority, Dowling points 
to Plan § 2.40.  That section has separate subsections for time 
spent in “Total Disability” and time spent in four specific types 
of “absences.”  (Plan § 2.40(4), (5), App. 148.)  Dowling 
suggests this separate treatment indicates the two terms are 
mutually exclusive—time spent in “Total Disability” is not an 
“absence,” and vice versa.  But the plan’s text does not go so 
far.  Section 2.40 does not purport to define “absence”; it just 
lays out four nonexclusive scenarios that fit the definition of 
“absence.”  Dowling’s argument is not without persuasive 
force—to the contrary, it is a reasonable one.  But it would be 
a stretch to say his interpretation is the only reasonable 
approach, to the exclusion of the plan administrator’s. 
 The second aspect that contributes to the plan’s 
ambiguity is its silence on how to calculate Final Average 
Compensation specifically for disabled participants.  The plan 
has a default method of pension-plan calculation and an 
exception to that default for disabled participants, in two 
relevant respects:  (1) the availability of a pension, and (2) the 
calculation of credited service.  Compare Plan § 4.02(a), App. 
155 (laying out the “General Rule” for “Credited Service”), 
and Plan § 6.01-03, App. 173-74 (laying out general rules for 
retirement benefits), with Plan § 4.02(c)(2), App. 157 
(providing special rules for disabled participants’ credited 
service), and Plan § 6.05, App. 178 (providing special rules for 
disability retirement benefits).  The plan, however, leaves a 
gaping hole as to whether the default-and-exception pattern 
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continues for calculation of the Final Average Compensation 
for disabled participants.  Given this gap, the plan 
administrator faced a choice:  (a) calculate Dowling’s Final 
Average Compensation in line with the default scheme, even 
though disabled participants are explicitly treated as sui generis 
with respect to pension-availability and credited service, or (b) 
calculate Dowling’s Final Average Compensation in line with 
the two disabled-participant exceptions that treat his formal 
retirement date like his final day of work, even though nothing 
in the plan says to do as much.  Given the silence, we cannot 
say that either approach is unreasonable. 
 Dowling, however, argues the silence can only be read 
in one way, to foreclose any deviation from the default scheme 
of determining Final Average Compensation, because of the 
expressio unius canon of construction:  since the plan explicitly 
provides an exception for disabled participants in two respects, 
and says nothing explicit for the Final Average Compensation, 
we must assume that the lack of explicit terms for the latter 
scenario indicates that no such exception exists.  That 
argument might win the day if we were reviewing the plan de 
novo, but the expressio unius canon cuts the opposite way 
when we are paying deference to a plan administrator, because 
when a plan administrator interprets a text that contains a 
“mandate in one section and silence in another,” the silence 
“often suggests . . . simply a decision not to mandate any 
solution . . ., i.e., to leave the question” open to the reasonable 
interpretation of the administrative decisionmaker.  Van 
Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Catawba Cty. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 36 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (finding in the context of Chevron deference that the 
expressio unius canon counsels against the court disturbing an 
agency’s interpretation)).  Such is the case here.  Dowling’s 
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criticism of the plan administrator’s approach is again not 
necessarily without merit, but when granting deference “we do 
not demand the best interpretation, only a reasonable one,” id. 
at 494, and the plan’s silence suggests the plan administrator’s 
approach is not unreasonable.   
 The third aspect that renders the plan ambiguous is its 
structure.  See Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 114-16 (3d Cir. 
2005) (looking to “text and structure” to determine ambiguity).  
Here, the relevant plan terms are structured into several 
“Articles,” three of which are relevant here:  Article II provides 
“Definitions,” Article IV describes the “Crediting of Service,” 
and Article VI lays out “Retirement Benefits.”  Across these 
articles, the plan effectively provides two sets of rules, as noted 
above:  a default scheme for the typical participant, and 
exceptions for disabled participants.  The default scheme and 
its exceptions are not neatly laid out in one article; they are 
scattered across all three articles, with bits and pieces in 
various sections and subsections, and the operation of it all 
must be determined by cross-referencing the various articles, 
sections, and subsections, and reading them together.  It is quite 
the legal task.  This buckshot distribution of relevant terms 
does little to clarify the disputes over the text and contributes 
to our finding that the at-issue provisions are ambiguous. 
 We also take pause to note two counterintuitive aspects 
of Dowling’s proposed interpretation.  First, Dowling wants all 
the benefits and none of the detriments of an artificial delay in 
the date he left work.  When it comes to Credited Service, he 
is content that the administrator deemed him to have worked 
an extra fifteen years of time, from 1997 to 2012, even though 
he did not, but when it comes Final Average Compensation, he 
disapproves of the administrator taking the same approach and 
deeming him to have received a fictional salary over the same 
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unworked period.  It should not be minimized how beneficial 
the first aspect of this scheme was for Dowling:  if he had not 
received Credited Service for the same post-disability pre-
retirement period that he does not want to be deemed to have 
been paid a salary, one estimate suggests his monthly payment 
would be only about 75% of the current payment—an amount 
that Dowling believes already too low.  (App. 118-19 (Willis’s 
1997 estimates of various scenarios).)  The point is that 
Dowling likes the fictional delay when it benefits him for 
purposes of Credited Service, but dislikes it when it hurts him 
on Final Average Compensation.  In other words, Dowling 
suggests that we read one provision two different ways, both 
to his advantage.  But there is nothing unreasonable about 
harmonizing Credited Service with the calculation of Final 
Average Compensation.   
 Additionally, for the typical disabled participant, 
Dowling’s position is likely worse and the administrator’s 
better.  For an employee whose base salary is the near-total 
source of income, the salary that employee receives in his or 
her final year of work may often be the highest of his or her 
career.  For Dowling, however, that was not the case, due to 
his high-ranking status and incentive bonuses that made up a 
hefty portion of his overall compensation.  Thus, by deeming 
him to receive only his base salary and no bonus over the final 
ten years of his Credited Service, Dowling was deprived of his 
three actual highest-earning years.  But for the typical 
employee whose pay comes mainly or exclusively from salary, 
with raises arriving in yearly step increases, it is Union 
Pacific’s interpretation that is best.  To illustrate, imagine an 
employee who is paid a base salary, no bonus, and receives a 
step-salary increase every year from Year 1 to Year 10.  In 
Year 10, the employee becomes totally disabled and leaves 
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work.  In Year 20, he begins to draw on his pension.  Under 
Union Pacific’s theory, he should be deemed to have been paid 
his Year 10 salary—his highest salary ever—from Years 10 to 
20, his high-three will necessarily be equivalent to his Year 10 
salary, and his pension payment will increase accordingly.  But 
under Dowling’s theory, the employee’s ten-year window 
should be based off Years 1 through 10, and his high-three will 
be Years 8, 9, and 10, resulting in an average salary that is 
inevitably lower than what he was paid in Year 10, and what 
he would have received under Union Pacific’s approach.  We 
suspect most employees are in situations closer to our 
hypothetical employee’s than to Dowling’s, and would benefit 
less from Dowling’s approach than the administrator’s.  While 
these counterintuitive aspects of Dowling’s position do not on 
their own render it unreasonable, they lend support to the 
reasonableness of the administrator’s interpretation.  
VI.  
 Finally, Dowling makes an argument that a conflict of 
interest requires us to look more skeptically at the 
administrator’s decision.  ERISA plan administrators are 
fiduciaries, and “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of 
interest, that conflict must be weighed as a ‘facto[r] in 
determining whether’” the administrator’s benefits decision 
should stand.  Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 187, cmt. d (Am. Law. Inst. 1959)).  A 
conflict “clear[ly]” exists when the employer “both funds the 
plan and evaluates the claims,” because “[i]n such a 
circumstance, ‘every dollar provided in benefits is a dollar 
spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . . . is a dollar 
in [the employer’s] pocket.’”  Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 
554 U.S. 105, 112 (2008) (quoting Bruch v. Firestone Tire & 
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Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part on other grounds, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)). 
 The mere existence of a conflict is not determinative, 
however, and a conflict on its own does not change our 
standard of review “from deferential to de novo.”  Id. at 115.  
A conflict is just another “factor,” and “Firestone means what 
the word ‘factor’ implies, namely, that when judges review the 
lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of 
several different considerations of which a conflict of interest 
is one.”  Id. at 117.  The conflict may “act as a tiebreaker when 
the other factors are closely balanced,” or it may mean little at 
all, depending on the other factors at play.  Id.  Also, the 
circumstances of the conflict itself may render it more or less 
significant, depending on whether those “circumstances 
suggest a higher likelihood” that the conflict actually affected 
the benefits decision.  Id.  For example, if “an insurance 
company administrator has a history of biased claims 
administration,” then it is more likely the conflict affected the 
benefits decision, and the court may grant less deference to the 
plan administrator.  Id.  On the other hand, if “the administrator 
has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote 
accuracy . . . by walling off claims administrators from those 
interested in firm finances, or by imposing management checks 
that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of whom 
the inaccuracy benefits,” then the conflict may be said to have 
been unlikely to infect the administrator’s decision, and may 
be of “vanishing” significance.  Id.   
 The Supreme Court exemplified this only-a-factor 
approach in the Glenn case.  Id. at 118.  The Glenn 
administrator-company was subject to a conflict, and evidence 
also showed it (1) refused to honor the government’s findings 
as to disability while encouraging the plan participant to pursue 
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government disability benefits, (2) emphasized medical reports 
that disfavored the claimant while deemphasizing reports 
cutting in the claimant’s favor, and (3) failed to provide the 
pro-claimant reports to medical experts.  Id.  On these facts the 
Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the administrator’s decision 
and the Supreme Court affirmed—yet the Court took care to 
note that the conflict of interest alone probably would not have 
warranted overriding the administrator’s decision, and that the 
additional bad facts were crucial.  Id. (suggesting the Sixth 
Circuit “would not have found the conflict alone 
determinative”). 
 Since Glenn, we have only been willing to disturb an 
administrator’s decision based on a conflict of interest if 
evidence either suggests the conflict actually infected the 
decisionmaking or if the conflict is one last straw that calls a 
benefits determination into question.  For an example of the 
last-straw scenario, in Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., we 
refused to uphold a benefits determination where the airline 
operated under a conflict of interest and also (1) doubled back 
on an initial factual finding that the plan participant was 
disabled, (2) considered extra factors not called for in the plan, 
(3) failed to comply with ERISA’s notice requirements, and (4) 
failed to fully evaluate an earlier diagnosis.  632 F.3d 837, 855-
56 (3d Cir. 2011).  We gave “significant weight” to the four 
factors other than the conflict and only “slight weight” to the 
conflict itself.  Id. at 855-56.  By comparison, in Fleisher v. 
Standard Insurance Co., there was a conflict, but the plan-
beneficiary presented no evidence at all that the conflict 
actually infected the administrator’s decisionmaking, and we 
were still willing to apply deference and affirm, without 
requesting additional factfinding.  679 F.3d at 122 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2012) (finding no evidence the conflict “affect[ed] the analysis 
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of [the] claim”); cf. id. at 130 (Garth, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the majority found no need to remand for additional 
factfinding). 
 Dowling’s case is more like Fleisher than Miller or 
Glenn, because we know very little about the Union Pacific 
administrator’s conflict.  A conflict does exist—Union Pacific 
both funds and administers the plan—but that is about all we 
know.  Dowling has highlighted no evidence suggesting Union 
Pacific has any sort of negative history of failing to properly 
exercise its fiduciary responsibilities, and Union Pacific has 
put forward nothing indicating that it took steps to wall off the 
plan administrator from the company’s financial 
decisionmaking or incentivize its staff to make accurate 
benefits determinations instead of reducing costs.  We do have 
the job titles of the relevant individuals—Willis worked in 
“Compensation and Benefits” and Schroer and Schaefer were 
in “Human Resources”—but titles alone do not tell us much.   
 The one fact that Dowling says cuts in his favor is an 
early flip-flop by Union Pacific that he analogizes to the 
problematic reversal in Miller.  In 1995, Willis and Dowling 
corresponded, and Willis told Dowling that Union Pacific 
would calculate Dowling’s Final Average Compensation the 
way Dowling now believes to be correct.  Then a year later, in 
1996, Willis wrote Dowling again and reversed his initial 
position, calculating that Dowling’s pension should be what 
Union Pacific later finally adopted in 2013.  But again, 
Dowling has presented the Court with nothing more than the 
bare fact of this reversal; no evidence suggests Willis’s 
motivation was ulterior, or anything other than a desire to 
correct what he saw as an errant calculation. 
28 
 
 Comparing Willis’s reversal to the problematic reversal 
in Miller also shows just how far Willis’s reversal is from 
warranting a skeptical take on Union Pacific’s conflict.  Three 
factors in Miller suggested the reversal was motivated not by a 
desire to correct an error, but instead by an ulterior cost-cutting 
motivation that might be attributed to the conflict:  First, the 
Miller reversal came on a factual question—whether the 
claimant was disabled—even though no new evidence had 
been received.  632 F.3d at 841-42, 855-56.  Here the reversal 
was on a purely legal question—how the plan’s complex terms 
should be properly interpreted.  Second, in Miller the initial 
decision resulted in the claimant actually receiving benefits, 
and the reversal cut off the flow of those benefits.  Id.  Here, 
the initial determination was preliminary and advisory, the 
reversal came a year later, and no benefits flowed for another 
17 years.  Third, in Miller the reversal was one of four factors, 
not including the conflict, that together undermined the Court’s 
trust in the administrator, the most notable factor being the 
administrator’s consideration of information not permitted by 
the plan document, which may have on its own been evidence 
of an arbitrary and capricious benefits determination.  Id. at 
855-56, 856 n.5.  Here, by comparison, Willis’s reversal is the 
only factor—not one of four—that Dowling has marshaled to 
support his argument that the conflict affected the 
administrator’s determination.  Without more, there is little 
indication that the conflict played a role, and its bare existence 
is not enough to justify disturbing the plan administrator’s 
otherwise reasonable decision. 
VII.  
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District 
Court’s decision sustaining the plan administrator’s calculation 
of Dowling’s pension benefit.  
John Dowling v. Pension Plan for Salaried Emp., et al. 
No. 16-1977 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Ambro, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 My colleagues see ambiguity in this case; I do not. John 
Dowling’s complaint is simple: Union Pacific’s Pension Plan 
provides a straightforward method for calculating the pension 
benefits of disabled former employees that the Plan 
administrator didn’t follow. If Dowling is correct, no amount 
of deference can justify the administrator’s decision. I believe 
he is. 
 As the majority notes, the amount of a Plan 
Participant’s1 pension benefits depends on two key figures: 
1) the Participant’s Credited Service; and 2) his Final Average 
Compensation. Plan § 5.01(a) (setting out the “Benefit 
Formula”). Dowling does not contest the Plan administrator’s 
calculation of his Credited Service. He argues only that the 
administrator miscalculated his Final Average Compensation 
and thus arrived at an incorrect pension benefit amount when 
he applied the Benefit Formula. Accordingly, this case turns on 
a single question: Should the Plan administrator have 
calculated Dowling’s Final Average Compensation by looking 
to the pay Dowling received during the ten years before he 
became disabled or the pay he received during the ten years 
before he retired? Section 2.35 makes clear that the answer is 
the former. 
                                              
1  Union Pacific’s Pension Plan capitalizes defined terms. In 
order to keep better track of them, I adopt that convention as 
well. See, e.g., Plan § 2.54 (defining “Participant”). There’s no 
dispute that Dowling is a Participant. 
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 The Plan provides that “‘Final Average Compensation’ 
shall mean the average of the Participant’s monthly 
Compensation for the 36 consecutive calendar months of the 
highest Compensation within the 120-calendar month period 
immediately preceding . . . the last date on which he is a 
Covered Employee . . . .” Plan § 2.35 (underscore in original). 
Put even more simply, Final Average Compensation is the best 
three consecutive years of pay an employee received in the ten 
years before he ceased to be a “Covered Employee.” So, to 
answer our question above, we need to know whether 
Dowling’s last day as a Covered Employee was the day before 
he started his period of disability on February 1, 1997, or just 
before he formally retired on October 1, 2012. 
 Again the answer is simple: Dowling was no longer a 
Covered Employee once his disability (multiple sclerosis) 
caused him to leave permanently in 1997. Admittedly, arriving 
at this answer requires working through a few of the Plan’s key 
terms. This requires attention at each step, but the steps are not 
hard to follow. 
 All agree that Dowling became a Disabled Participant 
on February 1, 1997. See J.A. 37; Plan § 2.25. A Disabled 
Participant is a Participant who suffers from a Total Disability 
and has had a “Separation from Service due to such Total 
Disability.” Plan §§ 2.25, 2.26. The day these events occur is 
called the “Disability Date,” and no one disputes that 
Dowling’s Disability Date is February 1, 1997. Plan § 2.25; 
J.A. 37. A Separation from Service occurs when an 
“Employee[’s] . . . Total Disability . . . causes him to cease to 
be an Employee[.]” Plan § 2.67, so there’s no question 
Dowling was no longer an Employee after his Separation from 
Service on his Disability Date in 1997. And a Covered 
Employee must be, at the very least, an “Employee.” See Plan 
§ 2.21(“‘Covered Employee’ shall mean each Employee in the 
employ of an Employer . . . .”). 
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 Paring things down, we’re left with the following: 
Dowling became a Disabled Participant when his Total 
Disability and Separation from Service terminated his status as 
an Employee; only an Employee may be a Covered Employee, 
so he ceased to be a Covered Employee at the same time; and 
all of this happened on February 1, 1997. 
 With this information in hand, we can return to Section 
2.35’s definition of Final Average Compensation. It instructs 
us to look to the “120-calendar month period immediately 
preceding . . . the last date on which [the Participant] is a 
Covered Employee . . . [,]” Plan § 2.35 (emphasis added)—i.e., 
the ten years between February 1, 1987 and February 1, 1997. 
The Plan administrator failed to follow these instructions, 
looking instead to the ten years preceding October 1, 2012, 
when Dowling was no longer working and had ceased to be a 
Covered Employee. Accordingly, the administrator’s 
calculation of Dowling’s Final Average Compensation was 
incorrect. 
 My colleagues, however, don’t see it this way. They 
focus on whether Dowling’s period of disability (from 
February 1997 to October 2012) counted as an “absence” per 
§ 2.18(a)(3)(C). In my view, their construction of that word, 
though creative, is beside the point. 
 Section 2.18 provides that “for a period of absence 
immediately prior to which [a Participant] is a Covered 
Employee . . . [, he] shall be deemed to have received 
Compensation at the base pay in effect for him” before the 
period of absence began. Plan § 2.18(a)(3)(C)(i). Because 
Dowling’s period of disability could arguably qualify as an 
“absence,” the contention goes, he is deemed to have received 
Compensation in the amount of his base pay from February 1, 
1997 to October 1, 2012. 
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 But as I show above, whatever Compensation Dowling 
was deemed to have received after February 1997 per § 2.18 is 
irrelevant to the calculation of his Final Average 
Compensation. This is because § 2.35 tells us to look to the 
period “preceding . . . the last date on which [the Participant] 
is a Covered Employee[,]”—February 1, 1997. Plan § 2.35 
(emphasis added). While, Section 2.18 tells us what Dowling 
was “deemed” to have received after he left work in 1997, 
§ 2.35 is clear that Final Average Compensation depends on 
what he was paid before he became disabled that year.2 
 Section 2.18 thus does not justify the Plan 
administrator’s calculation of Dowling’s Final Average 
Compensation by looking to the period between October 2002 
and October 2012. One justification Union Pacific offers (but 
on which the majority rightly declines to rely) lies in § 6.05. 
Under that section, certain Plan provisions apply to a Disabled 
Participant “as if his Separation from Service occurred on the 
date he ceases to be a Disabled Participant[.]” Plan § 6.05. If 
this language applied to the sections relevant to calculating the 
Final Average Compensation, which all appear in the Plan’s 
                                              
2 A careful reader might ask why § 2.18(a)(3)(C) would 
provide a rule for Compensation “deemed” received during an 
absence when § 2.35 calculates Final Average Compensation 
on the basis of the Compensation received before a Disabled 
Participant stops working. The answer is that the question 
before us is only one of many addressed by the Plan’s 277 
pages and 19 articles. Compensation deemed received by 
Disabled Participants per § 2.18(a)(3)(C) may be relevant to 
any number of other issues not before us. Indeed, the parties 
direct us to one: § 5.01(c)(2)(B)  relies on the Compensation a 
Participant is deemed to have received during a period of 
disability to offset the Participant’s pension benefits against his 
Social Security benefits. Plan § 5.01(c)(2)(B). 
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Article II, the Plan administrator’s choice would be vindicated. 
But § 6.05 makes clear that it only applies to “the other 
provisions of this Article [i.e., Article VI] (or Article VII)[,]” 
leaving unaffected the sections of Article II discussed above. 
 How my colleagues get around this is by providing a 
more imaginative explanation for why the Plan administrator 
was not bound by § 2.35: The Plan is silent on whether there 
exists a special rule for calculating the Final Average 
Compensation of Disabled Participants, so the Plan 
administrator was free to craft one. Maj. Op. at 20-21. To 
justify this innovative approach, they note that the Plan has 
special rules to calculate Disabled Participants’ years of 
Credited Service as well as the date their benefits become 
available that differ from the rules applicable to other 
Participants. Id. at 17. Thus they conclude that “[t]he plan . . . 
leaves a gaping hole as to whether a default-and-exception 
pattern continues for calculation of the Final Average 
Compensation for disabled participants.” Id. at 17–18. I find 
this conclusion dubious for two reasons. 
 First, I see no gaping hole. The special rule for Disabled 
Participants the majority seeks is provided in the sections 
discussed above. For the typical employee, calculating the 
Final Average Compensation is easy because the ten years 
preceding retirement will be his last ten years of employment. 
Id. at 5–6. But this is not so for a Disabled Participant. His 
Separation from Service occurs not at retirement but on his 
Disability Date, see §§ 2.25, 2.26; formal retirement might 
come years later. For this reason, the Plan carefully describes 
when an employee who becomes disabled ceases to be a 
Covered Employee. See Plan §§ 2.21, 2.25, 2.26 & 2.67. 
Because the rule for disabled former employees is contained in 
the definitions of Disabled Participant, Covered Employee, and 
other terms discussed above, there is no need for an alternative 
definition of Final Average Compensation for Disabled 
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Participants in § 2.35. All the work is done by the Plan’s 
definitions establishing who is a Covered Employee and when. 
 Second, my colleagues’ approach proves too much. In 
their view, the Plan failed to specify how to calculate a 
Disabled Participant’s Final Average Compensation. So rather 
than follow the default rule provided for all Participants, the 
Plan administrator was free to make one up. That can’t be right. 
If a Plan administrator may depart from a general rule 
whenever a more specific one might have been, but is not, 
provided, what’s to stop him from simply denying Disabled 
Participants their pensions entirely? Given that Dowling had 
not been working for over ten years, why deem him to have 
received any Compensation at all? Couldn’t the Plan 
administrator have decided that Dowling’s Final Average 
Compensation was zero dollars?  
 Presumably the response would be no, as such a rule 
would not be reasonable. And here, I believe, is the heart of the 
majority’s mistake. The Plan administrator credited Dowling 
with years of service during his period of disability and 
calculated his Final Average Compensation with respect to 
those same years. This, my colleagues believe, is a reasonable 
way to design a pension program: looking to the same years to 
calculate a Participant’s Credited Service and Final Average 
Compensation is “good policy.”3 
                                              
3 Although it should not bear on the outcome of this appeal, I 
am also not convinced the administrator’s decision necessarily 
represented good policy. Despite the majority’s skepticism, it 
makes sense that Disabled Participants continue to receive 
Credited Service even after their Final Average Compensation 
is fixed the day they leave work. A significant portion of 
Dowling’s pre-disability compensation was incentive and 
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 But we are not asked to opine whether the administrator 
has imagined a reasonable way to allocate pension benefits. 
Instead, we must decide whether his calculation of Dowling’s 
Final Average Compensation was “reasonably consistent with 
[the Plan’s] unambiguous text[.]” See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. 
Co., 679 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2012). It was not, and thus I 
respectfully dissent. 
                                              
merit pay. (His average total annual compensation from 1993 
to 1995 was $365,848, but his annual base pay during that 
period was $208,000.) Once disabled, of course Dowling 
received no incentive or merit pay; instead, the administrator 
“deemed” him to have received only his base pay. 
Accordingly, if the Plan looked to any period of disability in 
order to calculate the Final Average Compensation, pension 
benefits would not reflect the true economic value of 
employees during their working years. Participants like 
Dowling who received a large portion of their compensation in 
the form of merit and incentive pay would be short-changed. 
At the same time, because pension benefits often take many 
years to vest, if a Disabled Participant received no Credited 
Service during a period of disability, he could forfeit 
substantial pension benefits through no fault of his own. Thus 
it is reasonable to calculate a Disabled Participant’s Final 
Average Compensation based on what he earned when actually 
working and yet award him Credited Service during his 
disability to avoid a forfeiture of benefits. 
